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INTRODUCTION
It has long been established that the normal measure of dam-
ages for breach of contract is the so-called expectation measure-a
sum that puts the injured party in as good a position as if the con-
tract had been performed. Two other measures also are available:
reliance and restitution. Because these measures usually provide a
smaller amount of damages, they are generally used only when the
expectation measure is for some reason not available (e.g., the evi-
dence upon which the expectation measure rests is not sufficiently
certain). The reliance measure puts the injured party in as good a
position as if the contract had never been made; the restitutional
measure returns to the injured party any benefits (or their money
equivalent) that the breaching party gained at the injured party's
expense.'
Two views, however, challenge the expectation measure's pre-
eminent place. The older and better known, which I will sometimes
refer to as the estoppel-exception view, derives from arguments first
made in the preparation of the promissory estoppel sections of the
Restatement (First) of Contracts,2 published in 1932. At that time, com-
mentators asserted that the reliance measure of damages should be
the most to which the injured party was entitled for breach of a con-
tract resting on estoppel (instead of on consideration). Other com-
mentators expressed the same opinion after the Restatement (First)
was published, and a few courts subsequently limited damages on
this ground or at least seemed to. The Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts,3 published in 1981, implicitly recognized this view when it ex-
panded the principal promissory estoppel section to read that the
remedy in such a case "may be limited as justice requires. ' 4 Most
contract casebooks currently in print mention the estoppel-excep-
tion view and include cases, and sometimes commentary, on it.
The other view challenging the expectation measure did not
emerge until 1980 when it was put forward by some members of the
I E. ATLIN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 12.8, 12.16 (1982) (reliance measure); it.
§§ 12.19, 12.20 (restitutional measure).
2 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS (1932) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (FIRST)].
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (1981) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)].
4 Id. §90.
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law and economics movement. Its proponents argue that the expec-
tation measure provides excessive assurance of performance and
thus leaves the promisee without sufficient incentive to limit his reli-
ance. The promisor therefore bears a liability in excess of the value
of his performance, leaving society as a whole less well off-less effi-
cient, in economic terms. This view does not espouse the reliance
measure as the preferred alternative, but its supporters are critical
of the expectation measure. They have proposed means of dimin-
ishing the importance of the promisee's reliance in determining the
promisor's liability. To my knowledge, no court decision has yet
reflected this view, nor has any contract casebook mentioned it.
It is the thesis of this Article that both of these views are wrong.
Both rest on unwarranted assumptions or mistakes of law or fact.
The lion's share of this Article deals with the view that estoppel
damages should be limited by the reliance measure because the for-
mer's much longer history has supplied it with more aspects that
need to be taken into account. I will begin with a description and
analysis of its origins in the preparation of the Restatement (First).
I. THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN AN ESTOPPEL CASE
A. The Restatement (First) of Contracts
Prior to 1932, consideration was both the necessary and the suf-
ficient condition for enforcement of a promise. The doctrine of es-
toppel was confined to statements of fact, and it sounded in tort.
Some reported decisions conflicted with this generality, but they
were too few to constitute an alternative branch of law. No litigant
could have confidently relied on them.5 As is now well known, the
Restatement (First) of Contracts, published in 1932, changed all this. Its
section 90 reduced consideration to a sufficient, but not necessary,
condition for enforcement of a promise. It did this by expanding
estoppel to include promises as well as factual statements. This new
promissory estoppel doctrine sounded in contract, although "fac-
tual estoppel," as the older doctrine came to be called, continued to
be regarded as sounding in tort.
Samuel Williston and Arthur L. Corbin created promissory es-
toppel. Williston, the foremost contracts scholar of his day, served
as the Reporter for the Restatement (First). The younger Corbin al-
ready had a national reputation and would become the foremost
5 A search of LEXIS and WESTLAW inJune 1989 found no cases in point prior to
1932 that were not cited in the Reporter's Note to RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 90. Only two
early cases are cited in the Reporter's Note: Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W.
365 (1898), and Roberts-Horsfield v. Gedicks, 94 NJ. Eq. 82, 118 A. 275 (1922), aff'd
mem., 96 NJ. Eq. 384, 124 A. 925 (1924). Even they arguably support the law as § 90
stated it.
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contracts scholar upon the passing of Williston. The two of them
had little trouble introducing promissory estoppel into the Restate-
ment. Only a few members of the Contracts Section of the American
Law Institute opposed the concept, and their opposition apparently
had no basis other than that the common law did not already in-
clude the doctrine.6 It was the proposed remedy, which Williston
and Corbin assumed would be the same as for breach of contract,
that engendered opposition. Opponents of expectation damages
argued that the estoppel remedy should be limited to compensating
the promisee for his reliance.7 The basis for these scholars' position
is unclear; they may have expected the remedy to match the original
grounds of enforcement, as it sounded in tort.8 In any event, Wil-
liston tactically agreed to add to section 90 that promises that would
otherwise be enforceable by estoppel vel non, were instead "binding
if injustice can be avoided only by [their] enforcement .... ."
The added phrase is, to say the least, enigmatic. The section
makes a promise enforceable only if the promisor ought reasonably
to have foreseen the promisee's reliance and if the promisee in fact
relied to his substantial detriment. These requirements alone ap-
pear to be sufficient to make enforcement of the promise necessary
in order to avoid injustice; the added phrase seems superfluous and
it gives no hint of limiting the remedy, while still regarding the
promise as binding.
Unlike the Restatement (Second), the Restatement (First) has no offi-
cial comments, but it does have official illustrations.10 The illustra-
tions for section 90, however, expose the meaninglessness of the
added phrase rather than clarifying it. They do not demonstrate any
way in which the appended qualification is to affect whether a prom-
ise is binding. They also do not provide any guidance on the ques-
tion of limiting the remedy. The illustrations all end merely by
saying that the promise concerned is, or is not, "binding," without
saying anything about the appropriate remedy.
One suspects Williston of having hoodwinked the opposition.
He overcame it by agreeing to add language that he then rendered
meaningless through his choice of illustrations and lack of
explanation.
Judge Learned Hand of the United States Court of Appeals for
6 "A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise." RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 2, § 90.
7 See 4 A.L.I. PROC. 85-114 (App. 1926).
8 See, e.g., id. at 98-100, 110-12.
9 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 90.
10 E.g., id.
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the Second Circuit rendered the first major decision on section 90.
James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers," was decided the year after the
Restatement (First) was published. Several general contractors, in-
cluding the James Baird Company, were bidding on a construction
job. Gimbel Brothers wanted to do the linoleum flooring work, and
sent its subcontracting bid to all of these general contractors. The
subcontract bid contained the language, " 'If successful in being
awarded this contract, it will be absolutely guaranteed.... and...
we are offering these prices for reasonable' (sic) 'prompt acceptance
after the general contract has been awarded.' "12 The James Baird
Company relied on the low prices in the linoleum bid in preparing
its own bid, which it submitted before receiving word from Gimbel
Brothers that it was revoking the linoleum bid and would substitute
another at about double the prices.
The bid of the James Baird Company on the construction job
was accepted. Gimbel Brothers thereafter refused to recognize the
existence of a contract, and the James Baird Company completed its
work using another linoleum subcontractor. It sued Gimbel Broth-
ers on the theory of promissory estoppel. The Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's judgment for Gimbel Brothers on several
grounds. One was that promissory estoppel applies only to dona-
tive promises, which the court defined as promises made without the
expectation of receiving an equivalent in exchange. Promissory es-
toppel therefore does not apply to offers, which are made for an
exchange and are not expected to become promises until and after
the exchange has been received.' 3 A second ground was that there
was "not the least reason to suppose that [Gimbel Brothers] meant
to subject itself to such a one-sided obligation"'14 as would be the
case if its offer was interpreted as an option.
The first ground is illogical because it overlooks the possibility
dismissed in the second. If the offer was an option, then the addi-
tional promise of nonrevocation was "donative," since the grantor
of the option, by definition, did not expect an equivalent in ex-
change. And the second ground, that the offer could not have been
intended as an option, is simply incredible. In view of the circum-
stances and the prices being " 'absolutely guaranteed ... for rea-
sonable' (sic) 'prompt acceptance after the general contract has
been awarded,' ",5 it seems clear that Gimbel Brothers had intended
to subject itself to "such a one-sided obligation." What else could
11 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
12 Id. at 345.
13 Id. at 346.
14 Id.
15 Id at 345.
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these words mean? In any event, James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Brothers
died on the vine. Even now, fifty-seven years later, not a single deci-
sion follows it.16 With this lone exception, every court of last resort
that addressed the question accepted promissory estoppel. By 1969
almost every jurisdiction had adopted it. 17
B. Decisions Limiting the Remedy in Estoppel Cases
after 1932
Of the possibly hundreds of reported decisions applying prom-
issory estoppel since 1932, only three have been widely read as
holding that damages in a promissory estoppel case are limited to
the reliance measure. The first is Goodman v. Dicker,18 a 1948 deci-
sion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia. The defendant made representations and gave assurances to
the plaintiff that the plaintiff had, or would get, a franchise for sell-
ing the defendant's products. The plaintiff made expenditures in
reliance. 19 The main defense on appeal was that the franchise
would have been terminable at will anyway. 20 The court dismissed
this defense because it "miss[ed] the real point of this case." 21 The
court held that the situation was appropriate for the application of
"equitable estoppel," citing two very old United States Supreme
Court decisions. 22 The court never acknowledged the existence of
promissory estoppel. Equitable estoppel is the factual estoppel that
existed in the law of tort before the Restatement (First) was published.
Goodman v. Dicker is nevertheless included in seven contracts
casebooks as authority for limiting the remedy to the reliance
measure of damages in a promissory estoppel case. 23
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin handed down Hoffman v. Red
16 A search of Shepard's Federal Citations confirms this.
17 Stanley D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE
LJ. 343 (1969).
18 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
19 Id. at 684.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 685.
22 Id. (citing Arizona v. Copper Queen Mining Co., 233 U.S. 87, 95 (1914); Casey v.
Galli, 94 U.S. 673, 680 (1876)).
23 JOHN P. DAwsON, WILLIAM BuRNErr HARVEY & STANLEY D. HENDERSON, CASES
AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 268-71 (5th ed. 1987); E. ALLAN FARuNSwORTH & WILLIAM
F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 229 (4th ed. 1988); LON L. FULLER &
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAw 39-40, 290 (4th ed. 1981); FRIEDRICH
KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
209-12 (3d ed. 1986); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CON-
TRACTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 916 (2d ed. 1987); JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 290-92 (3d ed. 1983); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILL-
MAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 297-300
(1987).
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Owl Stores, Inc.24 in 1965. In Hoffan, the plaintiff substantially relied
for several years on the defendant's promises and assurances that
the plaintiff would get one of the defendant's franchised retail out-
lets if he met two conditions. First, the plaintiff had to cooperate
with the defendant in learning the business; second, he had to sup-
ply an $18,000 investment. As time wore on, the plaintiff depended
more and more upon the defendant's good faith by relinquishing his
former business holdings and moving himself and his family to vari-
ous parts of the state at the defendant's insistence. The defendant
also raised the plaintiff's investment requirement by increments to
$34,000. Because the plaintiff could not raise this much money, he
gave up 25 and sued on grounds of promissory estoppel. The de-
fendant, however, asserted that no contract existed and that its as-
surances and promises were only negotiations intended to lead to a
contract.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the award of reli-
ance measure damages to the plaintiff on the ground that both par-
ties' arguments were essentially correct. A contract never existed
because the parties never agreed on enough essential details, but
the defendant's promises were sufficient to trigger promissory es-
toppel.26 In limiting recovery to reliance damages, the court relied
on the Restatement's provision that a promise is binding "if injus-
tice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. ' 27 The
court quoted excerpts from two commentators to the effect that this
provision gave courts discretion to limit damages in promissory estop-
pel cases. 28 The court also cited a third excerpt that argued that
reliance damages were the most that a court should award in any
promissory estoppel case. 29 Despite this citation, the court's lan-
guage clearly shows an intent to use discretion only to limit damages
where appropriate on the facts of a case rather than to limit dam-
ages in all estoppel cases.30 Red Owl therefore does not support the
proposition that estoppel case plaintiffs are limited to recovery of
reliance damages; it supports only the weaker proposition that a
24 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
25 IA at 691, 133 N.W.2d at 271.
26 Id at 696, 133 N.W.2d at 275.
27 Id at 698-99, 133 N.W.2d at 275 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) § 90).
28 Id. at 701-02, 133 N.W.2d at 276-77 (quoting IA ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACrs § 200, at 221 (1963); WARREN L. SHATruCK, Gratuitous Promises-
A New Writ?, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 908, 912 (1937)).
29 Id at 702, 133 N.W.2d at 277 (quoting Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous
Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REv. 913, 926 (1951)).
30 See id. at 701, 133 N.W.2d at 276 ("Where damages are awarded in promissory
estoppel instead of specifically enforcing the promisor's promise, they should be only
such as in the opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice.").
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court has discretion to limit the plaintiff's recovery to reliance dam-
ages in an estoppel case.
Because the opinion offers no guidance on how this discretion
should be exercised, the case left Wisconsin law in a confusing state.
There are established rules for refusing expectation damages in cer-
tain cases. However, these rules rigidly require the presence of spe-
cific facts. The rules therefore operate to create exceptions rather
than exercises of discretion. The most common rule, for example,
is that a court should reject expectation damages unless it can esti-
mate them with reasonable accuracy. Either there is insufficient evi-
dence (for example, of the profits that would have been made by a
new business),3 1 or the broken promises were too indefinite to fur-
nish an estimate of how much the plaintiff would have benefited had
they been performed.3 2 In any event, one cannot reasonably read
the Wisconsin opinion as referring to these rules. The case dealt
with whether promissory estoppel provides some special reason for
refusing expectation damages, whereas these rules apply equally to
enforcement by estoppel and by consideration. Thus, while Red Owl
holds that promissory estoppel gives the court discretion to limit
damages, the case does not offer the slightest hint how or for what
purpose the discretion is to be exercised.
The force of the decision is further weakened because it was
unnecessary. The court should have reached the same result on the
basis of the established exceptions noted, without addressing prom-
issory estoppel issues. In fact, the case repeatedly mentions the in-
sufficiency of the evidence for estimating expectation damages.33 In
addition, the defendant's broken promises were too indefinite to
provide a basis for awarding expectation damages. The defendant
specified to the plaintiff neither the exact nature and location of the
store nor the precise amount of money the plaintiff would have to
provide. The court might have settled the question of damages by
determining the figure upon which the plaintiff initially relied to in-
voke promissory estoppel. The court, however, did not attempt to
make such a determination. The question of the nature and location
of the store presumably could not have been answered at all because
the parties' relationship had ended before a particular store had
been identified. Thus, even if the defendant's promises had been
supported by consideration, the court would have had no choice but
to limit damages in precisely the way it did. Nevertheless, Red Owl is
cited in eight contracts casebooks as authority for limiting damages
31 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.15, at 881-82.
32 JOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs § 2.9 (3d ed.
1987).
33 Red Owl, 26 Wis. 2d at 697-701, 133 N.W.2d at 274-76.
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in a promissory estoppel case.S4
In RCM Supply Co. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc.,S5 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's
judgment for RCM, which had been based on promissory estoppel.
RCM sought and obtained from Hunter Douglas a promise to give it
a franchise to distribute aluminum siding on condition it build a
warehouse and otherwise expand its operations to accommodate the
required stock of siding. Before Hunter Douglas gave RCM the dis-
tributorship, disputes and disagreements developed between the
two companies, and Hunter Douglas refused to go forward with its
promise.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment in
favor of RCM on the ground that RCM unreasonably relied on the
promise of Hunter Douglas. 36 That promise was oral, and RCM
spent nearly one million dollars in reliance on it. That sort of un-
reasonable reliance, the court held, "cannot support recovery under
principles of promissory estoppel."37
This reasoning is illogical. The court never questioned the na-
ture of the plaintiff's reliance, which apparently was exactly the kind
of reliance that a reasonable person under the circumstances would
expect.8 8 The only fault the court found was with the plaintiff's ex-
cessive amount of reliance. Thus, under the court's reasoning, the
plaintiff was denied all recovery for relying too much!
The court's opinion, however, did not stop there. It went on to
say, in dictum, that the district court had incorrectly used the reli-
ance measure of damages. All the evidence of damages concerned
the profits that RCM could have expected to make if Hunter Doug-
las had kept its promise. These would have been appropriate under
the expectation measure, but "[d]amages recoverable under a claim
of detrimental reliance are carefully circumscribed; the plaintiff may
recover only those specific expenditures made in reliance upon the
34 J. DAWSON, W. HARVEY & S. HENDERSON, supra note 23, at 271,404-10; E. FARNs-
WORTH & W. YOUNG, supra note 23, at 233-37; ROBERT W. HAMILTON, ALAN ScoTr RAU &
RUSSELLJ. WEINTRAUB, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNTRArs 485-96 (1984); F. KESSLER,
G. GILMORE & A. KRONMAN, supra note 23, at 223-24; C. KNAPP & N. CRYSTAL, supra note
23, at 217-27, 918-19; EDWARDJ. MuRPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRAar
LAW 288-96 (3d ed. 1984);J. MURRAY, supra note 23, at 292-302; R. SUMMERS & R. HiLL-
MAN, supra note 23, at 302-05, 461; see also L. FULLER & M. EISENBERG, supra note 23, at
500-08 (includes the case but does not explicitly address the damages issue); ROBERT E.
Scorr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CoNTRAcr LAW AND THEORY 161, 172-79 (1988) (same).
35 686 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1982).
36 Id. at 1078.
37 Id
38 Id at 1075, 1078 (plaintiff was told to expand its lines of siding, which is exactly
what it did).
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defendant's promise."3 9  The court's citation of authority for this
last statement makes so little sense that I can only quote it:
The damage award must be reduced by "the value of any benefits
... derived from the [expenditures]," Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber
Engineered Prods., Inc., 237 F.2d 879, 882 (4th Cir. 1956), and by
any unavoidable loss suffered by plaintiff without regard to the
defendant's conduct. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 349
(1981).40
This quotation obviously deals with mitigation of damages, not with
limitation by the reliance measure in a promissory estoppel case.4 1
The court should have used the mitigation principle to limit RCM's
recovery to the amount of reliance that Hunter Douglas could rea-
sonably have foreseen when it made its promise. The appropriate
resolution of the case then would have been to affirm the judgment
for RCM, but remand to the district court for a recalculation of dam-
ages in accordance with the mitigation principle.
RCM therefore offers no precedential support for the proposi-
tion that estoppel damages are limited by the reliance measure,
although it does include nonpersuasive dictum so stating,42 which is
more than can be said for the first two cases. Ironically, only one
contracts casebook includes RCM.4 3 In sum, none of the cases used
as precedent for the proposition that damages are limited to the re-
liance measure in an estoppel case actually is such a precedent, and
the only one that supports the proposition, albeit by dictum, does so
illogically.
C. Commentators Urging that Damages Be Limited in an
Estoppel Case
1. Arguments Resting on Categorizing Promissory Estoppel as a Tort
Orvill C. Snyder argued in 1949 that courts should not adopt
promissory estoppel as a grounds of enforcement because bar-
gained consideration was "the essence of contract." 44 Also, the
39 Id. at 1079.
40 Id. at 1079 n.8.
41 The court's reference to "any unavoidable loss" makes sense only on the as-
sumption that it is meant to refer to Restatement (Second) § 350, which deals with the
disallowance of avoidable losses. "Avoidability of losses" is the term used in the Restate-
ment (Second) for the mitigation principle. See id.
42 This dictum is weak even as dictum, however, because the authority the RCM
court cited for it is irrelevant. At this point, the court seems literally not to have known
what it was talking about.
43 THOMAS D. CRANDALL & DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
ON CoNTRAars 399 (1987).
44 Orvill C. Snyder, Promissory Estopped as Tort, 35 IowA L. REv. 28, 31 (1949).
RELIANCE IN CONTRACT DAMAGES
"primary" wrong to be rectified in an estoppel situation was a per-
son's detrimental reliance, not his failure to obtain the benefits of
performance of a promise.45 Warren A. Seavey made essentially the
same argument in 1951. Seavey traced the genesis of promissory
estoppel and showed, to his satisfaction anyway, that it was "basi-
cally a tort doctrine" and did not belong in the law of contracts.46
Seavey argued:
The wrong is not primarily in depriving the plaintiff of the prom-
ised reward but in causing the plaintiff to change position to his
detriment. It would follow that the damages should not exceed
the loss caused by the change of position, which would never be
more in amount, but might be less, than the promised reward.47
Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract48 maintained in 1974 that
contract law was "dying" because the bargain principle was being
both weakened by exceptions and replaced by reliance, which Gil-
more regarded as inherently sounding in tort. The enforcement of
promises without proof of consideration weakened contract law.
Tort replaced contract law to the extent that promissory estoppel
replaced consideration. 49 Gilmore does not deal with the remedy
for promissory estoppel; but, since his thesis is premised on promis-
sory estoppel sounding in tort, he should logically be grouped with
Snyder and Seavey as an advocate of limiting the remedy to the reli-
ance measure on the ground that such is the appropriate remedy for
a tort.
Randy E. Barnett claimed in 198450 to have found a "tension"
between bargain and reliance in that only the former leaves a person
free to bind himself, or not, as he chooses. Barnett therefore con-
nected the bargain principle, but not the reliance principle, with
freedom of contract. The basis of the claim is that the bargain prin-
ciple allows a promisor's intentions to determine his liability,
whereas reliance rests liability on blameworthiness which is not nec-
essarily linked to a promisor's intentions. According to Barnett, it
therefore follows that courts should normally reserve the expecta-
tion measure of damages, which fully enforces a promise, for
promises supported by consideration. Courts should award a tort
measure of damages (i.e., the reliance measure) only when the
promise did not constitute part of a bargain, but was made enforcea-
45 ' Id. at 32.
46 Warren A. Seavey, Reliance upon Gratuitous Contracts or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L.
REv. 913, 926 (1951).
47 Id.
48 GRANT GxLMOR, THE DFATm OF CoNTRAcT (1974).
49 Id at 87-92.
50 Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy (Book
Review), 97 HARv. L. Rv. 1223, 1241 (1984).
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ble solely by reliance. 51
All of these arguments founder on at least two grounds. First,
although factual estoppel sounded in tort, it does not follow that
promissory estoppel must, or should, also sound in tort. On the
contrary, the nature of promissory estoppel clearly makes it a part of
the law of contract. The subject of contract law is contracts, which
are by definition promises or sets of promises the law will enforce5 2
Promissory estoppel concerns the enforcement of a promise on the
grounds of reliance.
The second fallacy lies in the description of the wrong being
rectified as that of causing the plaintiff to change his position to his
detriment. If this were true, it would mean that it was wrongful-
tortiously wrongful-to make promises upon which others
foreseeably might rely to their detriment. This would lead to ab-
surd results. People make such promises everyday, especially in
business contexts. Surely there is nothing wrongful in their doing
so, nor would we want to discourage the practice by making it tor-
tious. 5a3 The wrong, rather, is in not performing the promise after
the promisee has relied upon it to his detriment. And the only mea-
sure of damages that is designed to compensate for this wrong is the
expectation measure.
Barnett's argument is also confused in its use of intentionality
and blameworthiness. Barnett regards promises supported by con-
sideration as intentionally binding, because the promisor knows that
when he accepts the consideration, he thereby makes his promise
binding. Supposedly, no such intention necessarily exists for a
promise made binding only by the promisee's reliance. But promis-
sory estoppel makes a promise binding only if the promise is one
"which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance of a definite and substantial character .... -55 That
which one reasonably expects to occur as a result of one's actions is
an intended result of those actions.56 Barnett's attempted distinction
on the basis of intention, therefore, is not well grounded. The
promisor whose promises are made enforceable by promissory es-
toppel has intended the promisee's reliance, just as the promisor
51 Id at 1241.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 1.
53 Imagine making it a tort, for example, for a delivery service to promise next-day
delivery anyplace in the country, if one should reasonably expect that people would rely
on it!
54 Barnett, supra note 50, at 1242.
55 RESTATEMENT (FIRST), supra note 2, § 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3,
§ 90 is to the same effect.
56 W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS 34, 36, 169-70 (5th ed. 1984).
208 [Vol. 76:197
RELIANCE IN CONTRACT DAMAGES
whose promise is made enforceable by consideration has intended
the consideration. Whether either also intends his promise to be
enforceable is a question the law of contract does not ask. Barnett's
attempted distinction on the basis of blameworthiness is similarly
unsound. It is equally blameworthy not to perform one's promises
whether they are made enforceable by consideration or by foresee-
able detrimental reliance. The blameworthiness derives from the
promise and also perhaps from its being enforceable, not from the
character of the grounds making it enforceable.
Barnett has done a good deal of work on promissory estoppel
and reliance in contract law. He has published two more pieces on
these subjects since the work I have just criticized, one of them with
Mary E. Becker.5 7 He does not appear to have changed his position,
still regarding promissory estoppel as standing somewhere between
tort and contract, with a foot in both. 58 Although his analysis of the
decisions leads him to say that "in most cases ... liability [under
promissory estoppel] can be understood as contractual in the broad
sense that the promisor apparently intended to assume a legal obli-
gation under an objective standard," 59 he is careful to distinguish
this conclusion from his normative beliefs. 60 In a descriptive piece
that Becker wrote independently, she also concludes that courts
have awarded expectation rather than reliance damages in promis-
sory estoppel cases "consistently and routinely, ' '61 not only in com-
mercial situations62 but also in purely donative situations. 63
2. Arguments Resting on a Desire for Symmetry between the Remedy
and the Grounds of Enforcement
All of the above positions seem to derive from an aesthetic of
symmetry, although none explicitly admits it. The aesthetic of sym-
metry matches the reliance enforcement rationale with the reliance
measure of damages. This symmetry may have a certain appeal, but
its logic does not withstand even the most superficial analysis. The
expectation remedy does not match the rationale for enforcement
with the measure of damages. If it did, the remedy for a breach of a
promise would be simply the return of the consideration. Symme-
57 Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986);
Randy E. Barnett & Mary Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppe Contract Formalities,
and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. Rav. 443 (1987).
58 Barnett & Becker, supra note 57, at 443, 445-46.
59 IL at 496.
60 Id at 446.
61 Mary E. Becker, Promissory Estoppel Damages, 16 HoFsTRA L. Rv. 131, 136 (1987).
62 Id at 140-55.
63 Id at 135-40.
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try, if carried to its logical conclusion, would eliminate the expecta-
tion measure as the remedy in every case.
3. Arguments Implicitly Equating Promissory Estoppel with a Duty to
Bargain in Good Faith
Another argument implicit in the above positions is that expec-
tation damages in some estoppel cases would overcompensate
plaintiffs and deter generally beneficial conduct. This argument is
implied in the characterization of Red Owl as a case recognizing a
duty of "good faith bargaining." 64 Under this interpretation, the
defendant committed a wrong when he failed to bargain in good
faith. If there is a duty of good-faith bargaining, then it derives from
tort; therefore, the appropriate remedy should equal the amount of
the victim's reliance. This view sees expectation damages as
overcompensating the plaintiff because bargaining in good faith
does not guarantee that a contract will result. This view further dis-
approves of awarding expectation damages in such cases because
excessive damages would ultimately deter good-faith bargaining:
bargainers would have to act overcautiously not to expose them-
selves to substantial liability.
This argument is flawed because it equates promissory estoppel
with a duty of good-faith bargaining. Promissory estoppel operates
only if there has been a promise, foreseeably relied upon by a prom-
isee. Bargaining, as such, does not involve promises. It is implicitly
understood that the "promises" either side offers do not actually
become promises unless and until the deal is made. What distin-
guishes bargaining in good faith from bargaining in bad faith is not
a question to be thoroughly pursued here, but one distinction might
be a secret intent on one side never to reach an agreement. This
party might, for example, hope to induce the other to waste time
and money in order to reduce its effectiveness as a business compet-
itor. This kind of bad-faith bargaining would not necessarily involve
any promises. The appropriate measure of damages would there-
fore be the victim's reliance. Indeed, the expectation measure could
not be applied, because there would be no promises by which to de-
termine the promisee's expectation. Nor is promissory estoppel ca-
pable of being applied to bad-faith bargaining as such, since it
requires reliance on a promise.
The argument also misinterprets Red Owl, although this is not a
matter of great importance. The Wisconsin Supreme Court clearly
found as fact that the defendant promised the plaintiff a franchise if
he trained with defendant and came up with the stated amount of
64 See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.26, at 191-92.
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money. However, if the Red Owl court did not think the defendant
had made such a promise, it lacked one of the essential elements of
promissory estoppel-a promise-and so ought not to have applied
it. The case then is precedent for the existence of a duty to bargain
in good faith, but one in which the court confused this duty with
promissory estoppel.
4. Arguments Implicitly Equating Promissory Estoppel with the
Enforcement of Donative Promises
Melvin Aron Eisenberg recommends that the remedy under
section 90 should normally be limited to the reliance measure be-
cause this ought to be the measure of damages if a promisee relies
upon a donative promise. He defines a donative promise as a prom-
ise to confer a benefit by gift. 65 Eisenberg's arguments for thus lim-
iting the remedy for breaches of donative promises are persuasive;
however, his implicit assumption that section 90 is limited to enforc-
ing relied-upon donative promises is wide of the mark. The section
is not so limited in either Restatement. The promises in Goodman, Red
Owl, and RCM were not donative.66 In fact, it is difficult to find any
promissory estoppel cases in which the promises were donative.
The only case I know of in which the court limited section 90 to
donative promises is Baird v. Gimbel, which, as mentioned earlier, has
never been followed.6 7
Eisenberg's recommendation is overinclusive since his reasons
for limiting the section 90 remedy are themselves limited to dona-
tive promises. In another respect, his argument is underinclusive.
He assumes not only that no promises other than donative promises
are made enforceable by section 90, but also that no donative
promises are made enforceable by consideration. This is simply un-
true. The doctrine of consideration includes a rule that a court will
not inquire into the adequacy of the amount.68 This rule permits
largely donative promises to be made binding by consideration.
The consideration is deliberately set at an amount that is inade-
quate, which makes the promise donative to the extent of the inade-
quacy. For example, parents sometimes sell their home to a child at
a price just over what it costs them to pay off the mortgage and their
moving expenses to a retirement community. 69 If donative
promises are to be subject to lesser enforcement, therefore, this rule
must include some means of distinguishing them from promises that
65 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 1 (1979).
66 See supra notes 13-42 and accompanying text.
67 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
68 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 2.11.
69 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 9, § 90 comment d.
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are not donative. But contrary to what Eisenberg evidently thinks,
an absence of consideration proves neither that a promise is dona-
tive nor that it is not.
D. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) was changed from its form
in the Restatement (First) to provide explicitly that the remedy in a
promissory estoppel case "may be limited as justice requires." 70
This possibility is dealt with in comment d, which begins:
Partial enforcement. A promise binding under this section is a con-
tract, and full-scale enforcement by normal remedies is often ap-
propriate. But the same factors which bear on whether any relief
should be granted also bear on the character and extent of the
remedy. In particular, relief may sometimes be limited to restitu-
tion or to .. .reliance rather than by the terms of the promise.
See §§ 84, 89; compare Restatement, Second, Torts § 549 on
damages for fraud .... 71
When there is a substantive change in one of the sections in a
new edition of a Restatement, one would expect the change to be
supported either by changes in the law itself (as in judicial decisions
since the publication of the previous edition) or by principles and
policies sufficiently persuasive to justify an exception to established
law. And in this case, there is a third expectation. Since the change
in section 90 has the effect of providing courts discretion to limit
damages in estoppel cases, section 90 should also provide guidance
as to how the discretion is to be exercised. Section 90, however,
meets none of these expectations. The decisions cited in support of
the change do not, in fact, support it. Not one principle or policy is
stated to explain it. No guidance on how one is to exercise the dis-
cretion is offered.
The first sentence of comment d is both puzzling and uninform-
ative. If a promise made binding under this section is a contract,
one would expect that "full-scale enforcement by normal remedies"
would always, or at least normally, be appropriate. The sentence is
uninformative in any event, because it does not state when such en-
forcement is appropriate. The second sentence is equally unen-
lightening, because nothing in section 90 or in the other sections it
references sets forth the "factors which bear on whether any relief
should be granted... ." Section 84 deals with promises to perform
a duty despite nonoccurrence of a condition. Section 89 deals with
modification of an executory contract. Neither has anything more to
70 Id § 90.
71 Id § 90 comment d.
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do with promises made enforceable by reliance than with promises
made enforceable by consideration. The same is true of the section
referred to in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Comment d includes Illustrations 8 through 12. Illustration 872
is based on Goodman v. Dicker.73 Illustration 10'4 is based on Red
Owl.'75 After noting that Illustration 8 is based on Goodman, the Re-
porter's Note directs the reader to "cf."17 6 Terre Haute Brewing Co. v.
Dugan."7 In Terre Haute the court excluded lost profits from the
plaintiff's recovery, not for reasons related to promissory estoppel,
but because it found the contract void for want of mutuality. 78 The
court then followed the void-for-mutuality rule of agency law, and
limited an agent's recovery of expenses incurred in reliance upon
his principal to those which he had not had time to recoup before
the principal discharged him. The Terre Haute court never men-
tioned promissory estoppel.
Illustration 979 is based on Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby.8° Both in
72 A applies to B, a distributor of radios manufactured by C, for a "dealer
franchise" to sell C's products. Such franchises are revocable at will. B
erroneously informs A that C has accepted the application and will soon
award the franchise, that A can proceed to employ salesmen and solicit
orders, and that A will receive an initial delivery of at least 30 radios. A
expends $1,150 in preparing to do business, but does not receive the
franchise or any radios. B is liable to A for the $1,150 but not for the lost
profit on 30 radios.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, illustration 8. Compare RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) AGENCY § 329.
73 See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
74 A, who owns and operates a bakery, desires to go into the grocery busi-
ness. He approaches B, a franchisor of supermarkets. B states to A that
for $18,000 B will establish A in a store. B also advises A to move to
another town and buy a small grocery to gain experience. A does so.
Later B advises A to sell the grocery, which A does, taking a capital loss
and foregoing expected profits from the summer tourist trade. B also
advises A to sell his bakery to raise capital for the supermarket franchise,
saying "Everything is ready to go. Get your money together and we are
set." A sells the bakery taking a capital loss on this sale as well. Still later,
B tells A that considerably more than an $18,000 investment will be
needed, and the negotiations between the parties collapse. At the point
of collapse many details of the proposed agreement between the parties
are unresolved. The assurances from B to A are promises on which B
reasonably should have expected A to rely, and A is entitled to his actual
losses on the sales of the bakery and grocery and for his moving and
temporary living expenses. Since the proposed agreement was never
made, however, A is not entitled to lost profits from the sale of the gro-
cery or to his expectation interest in the proposed franchise from B.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, illustration 10.
'75 See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, Reporter's Note.
77 102 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1939).
78 Id- at 427.
'79 The facts being otherwise as stated in Illustration 8, B gives A the errone-
ous information deliberately and with C's approval and requires A to buy
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the illustration and in Quimby, lost profits were granted. In the
course of deciding the appropriate remedy, the Quimby court quoted
Fuller and Perdue: "Courts have, in fact, done at least four different
things about promises which have given rise to unbargained-for reli-
ance: (1) nothing, (2) granted restitution, (3) reimbursed the prom-
isee's losses through reliance, (4) secured for the promisee the
expectancy or its value." 8' The court then stated that "all these
possibilities are recognized in the Restatement [First] except the
third."8 2 Thus, Quimby held that promissory estoppel, as stated in
the Restatement (First), did not allow a court to limit damages to the
reliance measure, even in its discretion!
After noting that Illustration 10 is based on Red Owl,83 the Re-
porter's Note directs the reader to "[s]ee also" 84 Janke Construction
Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co.85 This federal district court sitting in Wis-
consin followed Wisconsin law as it understood it from Red Owl, as
the United States Constitution requires.8 6 It is difficult to imagine
how this was thought to support the change in the section.
Illustration 1187 is said to be based on Miller v. Lawlor.88 This
case concerns a court's equitable discretion whether to grant
specific performance (which it did in this instance), not whether to
grant expectation or reliance damages under promissory estoppel.8 9
Finally, Illustration 1290 is said to be based on Kauffman v.
the assets of a deceased former dealer and thus discharge C's "moral
obligation" to the widow. C is liable to A not only for A's expenses but
also for the lost profit on 30 radios.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, illustration 9. For text of Illustration 8, see
supra note 72.
80 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123, reh'g denied, 51 Del. 295, 144 A.2d 885 (1958).
81 Id. at 283, 144 A.2d at 133-34 (quoting Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr.,
The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE LJ. 373, 405 (1937)).
82 Id.
83 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, Reporter's Note.
84 Id
85 386 F. Supp. 687 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aft'd, 527 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1976).
86 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79-80 (1938).
87 A is about to buy a house on a hill. Before buying he obtains a promise
from B, who owns adjoining land, that B will not build on a particular
portion of his lot, where a building would obstruct the view from the
house. A then buys the house in reliance on the promise. B's promise is
binding, but will be specifically enforced only so long as A and his succes-
sors do not permanently terminate the use of the view.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, illustration 11.
88 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954).
89 Id. at 1155-56, 66 N.W.2d at 274-75.
90 A promises to make a gift of a tract of land to B, his son-in-law. B takes
possession and lives on the land for 17 years, making valuable improve-
ments. A then dispossesses B, and specific performance is denied be-
cause the proof of the terms of the promise is not sufficiently clear and
definite. B is entitled to a lien on the land for the value of the improve-
ments, not exceeding their cost.
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Miller.91 The reader is also directed to "cf." Aiello v. Knoll Golf
Club,92 and to "see" various A.L.R. annotations. 93 ,
In Kauffman a son-in-law sued his father-in-law, demanding an
accounting of improvements the son-in-law made on land that be-
longed to the father-in-law and that the father-in-law had promised
would be willed to the son-in-law. The father-in-law changed his
mind and had the son-in-law ejected from possession. The court
granted the accounting, apparently on a theory of unjust enrich-
ment.94 No mention was made of promissory estoppel or of the ap-
propriate measure of damages.
Like Kauffman, Aiello was a suit by a person in possession for an
accounting for improvements, against an owner who had revoked
his oral promise to give the land to the possessor. The court found
for the owner on the grounds that his promises had not induced the
possession to make the improvements. 95 Although the court men-
tioned in applying the "doctrine of parol gift"96 that the doctrine
was "based upon the reliance of the transferee on the representa-
tions of the promisor-a form of promissory estoppel," 97 there was
no mention of limiting damages.
The cited A.L.R. annotations concern the specific performance
of oral promises to convey real property, 98 the enforceability of such
promises,99 and the "[m]easure and items of recovery for improve-
ments mistakenly placed or made on land of another."' 100
Thus, of the five illustrations accompanying comment d, three
rest on cases irrelevant to the "partial enforcement" of promises
made enforceable by estoppel, one rests on a case that holds that a
court has no discretion to limit damages on that account, and one
rests on Red Owl. The three cases that comment d indirectly cited' 01
also offer no support, and none of the secondary authorities cited
even bears on the subject of partial enforcement under promissory
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, illustration 12.
91 214 Ill. App. 213 (1919).
92 64 NJ. Super. 156, 165 A.2d 531 (1960).
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, Reporter's Note. See Annotation,
Measure and Items of Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly Placed or Made on Land ofAnother, 24
A.L.R.2d 11 (1952); Annotation, Comment Note--Parol Gift of Realty, 155 A.L.R. 76 (1945);
Annotation, Doctrine of Part Performance in Suits for Specific Performance of Parol Contract to
Convey Real Property, 101 A.L.R. 923, 985 (1935).
94 Kauffman, 214 Ill. App. at 216-17.
95 Aiello, 64 N.J. Super. at 164-66, 165 A.2d at 535-36.
96 Id at 160, 165 A.2d at 533.
97 Id at 163, 165 A.2d at 535.
98 101 A.L.R. 923, 985 (1936).
99 155 A.L.R. 76 (1945).
100 24 A.L.R.2d 11 (1952).
101 Terre Haute, Aiello and Janke Construction.
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estoppel. So, with the possible exception of Red Owl, the attempt of
Restatement (Second) to support the change in section 90 is specious,
and the validity even of Red Owl as authority for this purpose is
doubtful.
The lack of any judicial or scholarly authority would not be
problematic if the Restatement presented any reasoned arguments
supporting section 90, but none is offered. Not only is the Restate-
ment's discretion for limiting the damages in an estoppel case un-
supported by either reason or authority, it is badly conceived. It is
discretion without principle or purpose. The only purpose stated is
"to do justice," but every rule of common law is supposed to do
justice. In any event this admonition fails to explain why limiting
the remedy is more necessary to justice in an estoppel case than in a
case resting on consideration.
There is, however, an evident purpose for exercising the discre-
tion in one particular situation. The Restatement (First) made a re-
lied-upon promise enforceable only if the reliance was "of a definite
and substantial character." The Restatement (Second) dropped this
condition. The discretion for limiting the remedy, therefore, might
be exercised to reduce the remedy to a recovery of the amount of
the reliance when the amount was thought to be too small to justify
enforcing the promise by awarding the expectation measure of dam-
ages.10 2 Nothing in the official illustrations or comments to section
90 suggests that this was the intended purpose of the discretion, but
some statements at the very beginning of the Reporter's Note
clearly indicate it:
The principal change from former § 90 is the recognition of the
possibility of partial enforcement. . . .Partly because of that
change, the requirement that the action or forbearance have "a
definite and substantial character" is deleted .... 103
This is indeed a sensible purpose, but it does not purport to be the
only purpose and therefore does not remove the arbitrariness of the
discretion. Since the purpose of limiting the damages to the prom-
isee's reliance is applicable only where the reliance is very small rel-
ative to the value of the promise, this purpose has no general
application. Since there are still other unnamed purposes, the dis-
cretion remains unbounded.
II. THE INADEQUACIES OF THE RELIANCE MEASURE
All the commentators mentioned in Part II urged the limitation
102 For reasons why the expectation measure is the only measure that can logically
be said to enforce the promise, see infra note 104-09 and accompanying text.
103 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 3, § 90, Reporter's Note (emphasis added).
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of damages to the reliance measure in estoppel cases while ignoring
the results that could be expected in terms of compensation, deter-
rence, and other aspects of conduct. This is a serious mistake.
Although there are exceptions, the results of generally using the re-
liance measure in estoppel cases are both substantial and unjust.
Analysis of the expectation measure shows it to be superior to the
reliance measure in virtually every respect.
A. Inadequate Compensation in Principle
The compensation principle underlies virtually every law in
which damages entitlements exist. The principle states that dam-
ages must be sufficient to put the injured party in as good a position
as he would have been had he not been wrongfully injured. One
step in applying the compensation principle is identification of the
wrong. This requires that one identify the conduct that ought to be
deterred and for which a person who injures another in the course
of that conduct deserves liability to the injured party as punishment.
A second step is to measure the extent of the resultant injury. This
measurement is necessary to the calculation of the amount that will
restore the injured party to as good a position as if the wrong had
not been done. As applied in a tort case such as an automobile acci-
dent, the principle identifies careless driving as the conduct to be
deterred and for which punishment by way of liability is justified. It
then dictates that damages be sufficient to restore the victim's per-
son and property to their pre-accident condition.
The wrong in a contract case is the failure to perform the prom-
ise. This failure to perform is the conduct we seek to deter or pun-
ish by imposing liability. As a rule, deterrence in a contract case is
supposed to be only conditional; a party is entitled to breach if he
fully compensates the other party for the injuries that result. This
qualification is introduced by the efficiency principle, which is dis-
cussed below.' 0 4 It does not eliminate the deterrence purpose from
the compensation principle in contract law; it merely qualifies it.
The amount of damages is set by the expectation measure, because
this is the amount required to put the injured party in as good a
position as if the promise had been performed. Thus, the expecta-
tion measure is the compensation principle applied to contracts.
This application logically applies equally to all contracts, whatever
their basis. It therefore applies just as much to a promissory estop-
pel case as it does to a consideration case.
The only way the reliance measure can be made to fit this com-
pensation principle is to regard the wrong not as the failure to per-
104 See infra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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form the promise, but as the making of the promise in the first
place, at least if it were reasonably foreseeable that people would
rely on it. This construction must be rejected as contrary to the mo-
res and practices of our society. As a rule, promising is not wrong-
ful conduct. We do not want to deter promising, and we do not
want to hold people who promise liable to those who rely on their
promises. Relying on a promise is not an injury in itself; it becomes
one only if the promise is not performed. On the contrary, the abil-
ity to make and rely upon promises is an enormous benefit in a soci-
ety like ours. The economy requires the making and keeping of
numerous promises in order to function efficiently, and the social
fabric is knit together with promises. Acts and events as diverse as
marriage ceremonies, oaths of office, oaths of church membership,
and children's games consist of promises in significant part.105
A common example that illustrates how gross an undercompen-
sation reliance damages can be, even when reliance is the basis of
enforcement, can be drawn from the insurance industry. Life insur-
ers customarily promise to provide life insurance as of the moment
the insurer receives the application, even if they subsequently de-
cide to reject the application on the grounds of an unsatisfactory
medical examination. The applicant either gets a full refund of any-
thing he paid if his application is rejected, or he is not required to
pay anything until it is accepted.10 6 There is certainly no considera-
tion for the insurer's promise in the latter case and probably not in
the former. Promissory estoppel, however, would ordinarily make
the promise enforceable by or on behalf of the person's benefi-
ciaries should the person die during the interim period. But if reli-
ance were the measure of damages, the beneficiaries would recover
at most the premium and the applicant's expenses for a medical ex-
amination. Then again, they might receive nothing at all because, as
beneficiaries, they had expended nothing in reliance.10 7 Only under
the expectation measure would they be entitled to the amount of the
insurance.
There is a situation for which the reliance measure is appropri-
ate, but it is not a breach of contract situation. When a person
makes a contract on the basis of a mistake of fact, and the other
party acts in reliance on the situation, it is logical to view the wrong
105 To repeat the example given earlier: to count the making of the promise rather
than the failure to perform it as the wrong logically requires us to count as wrongful the
promises that are regularly made by commercial delivery services to deliver packages no
later than the next day-at least if it were reasonably foreseeable that people would rely
on the promises by using the delivery services of those providers.
106 II ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 33 (1987).
107 The beneficiaries presumably would be entitled to enforce the promise as third
party beneficiaries even though the reliance that made it enforceable was the decedent's.
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as the mistake rather than as the failure to perform the contract
based on it. The law generally allows the mistake-making party to
withdraw from the contract if he promptly notifies the other party of
the mistake upon discovering it, and the mistake-making party com-
pensates the other party for any material interim reliance. This is
known as the "unilateral mistake" doctrine. 10
It would be superficial to confuse the unilateral mistake doc-
trine with the reliance measure for breach of contract. The doctrine
of unilateral mistake excuses the mistake-making party from the con-
tract. It does. not conceive of him as breaching it. Nor does any-
thing in the doctrine or its application depend on whether the
contract rests on consideration or reliance. The mistake doctrine
has been applied in both instances.10 9
B. Additionally Inadequate Compensation in Practice
Even by their own measure, reliance damages undercompen-
sate in practice. After breach, putting the injured party in as good a
position as if the contract had never been made usually requires a
determination of what other contracts would have been made. The
same reasons that impelled the making of the breached contract
presumably would have impelled the injured party to make others of
a similar nature had he not made the breached one. In Goodman, Red
Owl, and RCM, for example, the breached contracts all involved the
giving of franchises.' 10 The plaintiffs in each case presumably
would have made franchise agreements with other franchisors or, at
least; would have been engaged in gainful employment had they not
entered these particular arrangements.
Yet, sufficiently certain evidence of what these other arrange-
ments would have been is almost sure to be lacking. Reliance meas-
ure damages therefore almost always rest, in practice, on the
unrealistic assumption that the plaintiff would have done nothing-
at least nothing profitable-had the breached contract not been
made. The plaintiff, as a result, is not really placed in as good a
position as if the contract had not been made. He is actually com-
pensated only for his out-of-pocket expenses and receives nothing
for his lost opportunities."'
108 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 9.4.
109 See id.
110 Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Hoffhan v. Red Owl
Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 687, 133 N.W.2d 267, 269 (1965); RCM Supply Co. v. Hunter
Douglas, Inc., 686 F.2d 1074, 1075 (4th Cir. 1982).
111 Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CAUF.
L. REv. 1434, 1461-62 (1985), makes the same point.
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This is not the end of the difficulties, however.11 2 Even if a
plaintiff could prove with reasonable certainty the profits he would
have made on his lost opportunities, these profits could not be fully
counted in computing his reliance damages. The profits on each
such lost opportunity must be discounted by the probability that the
promises concerned would not have been kept. If those promises
would not have been kept, the plaintiff has no greater entitlement to
those lost profits than to the profits he lost by relying on the defend-
ant's promise. He would only be entitled to his out-of-pocket reli-
ance expenditures. 313
This last point also answers an argument sometimes made in
support of the reliance measure generally. 1 4 The argument ac-
knowledges the difficulties of proof of lost opportunities and asserts
that when these difficulties would be too great, the plaintiff should
be allowed to use the expectation measure because it provides a
rough approximation of the profits that would have been made on
the lost opportunities. Under existing law, however, the reliance
measure is used to supplement the expectation measure when proof
of expectation is difficult. 1 5 Alternatively, the expectation measure
could be used to supplement the reliance measure in cases where
proof of reliance would be difficult. But this argument overlooks
the point previously made: under the reliance measure, the value of
lost opportunities would not amount to the full profits the plaintiff
might have made on them."16
The facts of Drennan v. Star Paving Co. 117 serve as an illustration.
The defendant, Star Paving Company, made a bid to do the paving
work on a construction job for a school district. It submitted this
bid to several general contractors, including the plaintiff, Drennan.
Drennan computed his bid on the basis of Star's bid and submitted
it, along with a bond for ten percent of the amount, to the school
district. Later, Star notified him that it was withdrawing its bid be-
cause it had made a mistake in computing it. Drennan completed
the job using a different paving subcontractor, and sued Star for the
difference between what he paid the other paving subcontractor and
the amount he would have paid Star. The trial court held for Dren-
112 That no one has noticed the additional difficulties I am about to discuss is per-
haps explained by the fact that the difficulties I have previously explained so often prove
to be insurmountable that the additional difficulties are only rarely encountered.
113 Unless, of course, he could prove with reasonable accuracy the existence of still
more opportunities, which he would have lost had he not taken the opportunities he lost
by relying on the first promise, and so on, ad infinitum 1
114 See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 81, at 373-76.
115 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
116 See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
117 51 Cal. 2d 409, 333 P.2d 757 (1958).
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nan, Star appealed, and the Supreme Court of California affirmed
on the basis of promissory estoppel. The court held that Star's bid
was accompanied by an implicit promise not to withdraw it until
Drennan had had a reasonable opportunity to accept it, if he relied
on it in bidding for the job and his bid was accepted. This promise
was implied by the fact that Star knew, or reasonably should have
known, that Drennan would rely on its bid in making its own bid to
the school district.118
Imagine the difficulties the court would have had determining
the reliance damages. If Drennan had not relied on Star's bid, he
presumably would have relied on some other paving contractor's,
which would not necessarily have been the next lowest. General
contractors do not choose their subcontractors solely on the basis of
price; they consider other factors like quality and reliability. First,
the court would have had to determine which other bid Drennan
would have relied upon. The second question would have been how
much this would have increased Drennan's own bid. The increase
would not necessarily have been the precise amount of the differ-
ence between the paving bids, because Drennan might have decided
to absorb some of the difference in order to have a better chance of
obtaining the construction job.
Third, the court would have had to determine whether Drennan
would have been awarded the job if he submitted this higher bid. If
Drennan would have received the job, he would not have suffered
any damages at all (by the reliance measure) except to the extent of
the difference, if any, between the two paving bids he decided to
absorb. Furthermore, if he would not have been awarded the job
with the higher bid, he not only would have been undamaged (again
by the reliance measure), he presumably would have profited from
Star's conduct. As long as he made some profit despite paying more
to another paving subcontractor than he would have paid Star, he
would be better off having gotten the job than not-unless he could
prove that if he had not received the school job, he would have bid
on and been awarded some other, more profitable job.
Finally, if all the above had been proven with reasonable accu-
racy, Drennan would still have to prove the probability that the pav-
ing subcontractor upon whose bid he would have relied would have
reneged on its bid. The total lost profits would then have to be dis-
counted by this probability. This last step, of course, would be re-
quired because if the substitute paving contractor had reneged,
Drennan would not have been able to recover expectation measure
damages from him, either. Star's bid was in fact $7131.60, and
118 Id at 415; 333 P.2d at 760.
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Drennan paid another paving contractor $10,948.60.119 If Drennan
would have had to prove all of the above in order to collect anything
at all, his lawyer undoubtedly would have advised him to forget it.
Any judgment he could have hoped to get would not have covered
his legal costs.
C. Inability to Deal with Partial Breaches
A reliance measure fails to provide an adequate remedy for par-
tial failures of performance. This inadequacy results from the reli-
ance measure's failure to measure accurately the harm done by the
wrong.120 The facts of Red Owl again serve as an illustration. Sup-
pose that the defendant gave the plaintiff his franchise, but it was
less valuable than the defendant had promised. It might be badly
located, for example. But if it was still of enough value to the plain-
tiff to exceed his reliance expenditures, the defendant would owe
him nothing by the reliance measure. For this reason, almost all
partial failures of performance would go uncompensated. People
rarely enter into contracts unless they expect to receive substantially
more value from them than what they give in return. Otherwise
there would be no point in incurring the transaction costs.
The complete failure to compensate at all for most partial fail-
ures of performance would be more than an injustice. It would also
have a devastating effect on the incentives for full performance.
The facts of Red Owl also illustrate this point.121 Suppose the de-
fendant acknowledged that it had promised the plaintiff a franchise
for only $18,000. Also suppose that the plaintiff's reasonably fore-
seeable reliance on the promise had made it enforceable, so that the
defendant would be liable if it did not perform. If the measure of
liability were merely the plaintiff's reliance, however, the defendant
would have no incentive to give the plaintiff any franchise that was
worth more than the amount by which the plaintiff had already re-
lied. Therefore, it could deliver a much less valuable franchise than
it had promised, with impunity.
D. Conceptual Confusion
Conduct that gives rise to promissory estoppel is often factually
indistinguishable from conduct that gives rise to consideration,
where the consideration is the performance requested by an offer
for a unilateral contract. This conceptual confusion is harmless so
long as the legal consequences of the two doctrines are the same. It
119 Id. at 412; 333 P.2d at 759.
120 See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
121 For the facts of Red Owl, see supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
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becomes quite harmful, however, when the consequences differ by
limiting damages to the reliance measure in the case of promissory
estoppel. When a person promises to do something if the promisee
does something in exchange (as opposed to only promising to do
something in exchange), and the promisee does that something, the
result is a contract. The thing done is the consideration that makes
the promise enforceable. This is called a "unilateral contract," be-
cause there is a promise only on one side.' 22 But since the prom-
isor, under these circumstances, also reasonably expects that his
promise will induce the promisee to do the thing asked for, the
promise is also enforceable under promissory estoppel. If promis-
sory estoppel were to limit the promisee's remedy to the reliance
measure, one would either have to overrule more than a century of
precedents on unilateral contracts, which have always entitled the
promisee to expectation damages, or find some nonexistent basis
for distinguishing them from cases of promissory estoppel. Consid-
eration doctrine and promissory estoppel simply overlap in these
instances.
Moreover, these instances are not unusual. All three cases dis-
cussed earlier-Goodman, Red Owl, and RCM-in which the courts
gave only reliance measure damages, were instances of such over-
lapping. In none of them did the defendant make an unqualified
promise of a franchise. In all of them, the promise was conditional
on the plaintiff's doing or giving something in exchange. There-
fore, they all could have been decided on the ground that the parties
had entered unilateral contracts. Established law would then man-
date expectation damages (assuming that problems of certainty of
proof, definiteness of the promise, etc., could be surmounted).
None of the commentators123 urging that damages be limited to the
reliance measure in estoppel cases has explained how to distinguish
estoppels from offers for unilateral contracts.
There is a way of avoiding this conceptual confusion, but it has
its own difficulties. The alternative method involves its own concep-
tual confusion, and would limit damages to the reliance measure in
only a few types of estoppel cases. This method redefines promis-
sory estoppel as a ground of enforcement available only if all its
elements are present and, in addition, if enforcement on the
grounds of consideration (on a unilateral-contract theory) is notjus-
tified. Thus, all the "overlap" 'cases would be covered by considera-
tion alone, and promissory estoppel would apply only if the promise
is otherwise unenforceable. This is the concept of promissory es-
122 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 3.5.
123 See supra notes 44-69 and accompanying text.
1990] 223
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
toppel that Judge Learned Hand had in mind in Baird v. Gimbel, the
1933 case that was never followed. 124 Under Baird v. Gimbel, Good-
man v. Dicker, Red Owl, RCM, and virtually all of the other reported
decisions using promissory estoppel since the publication of the Re-
statement (First) in 1932 would have been decided differently. Prom-
issory estoppel would apply only if the promise were truly donative,
which is to say, made with no expectation of receiving anything in
exchange.
Yet, the conceptual confusion this approach encounters is al-
most as bad as that which it avoids. In any case in which the promise
is conditional, the condition must be examined to determine
whether it is merely a condition of receiving the benefit of the prom-
ise or something that the promisor wants in exchange. If it is the
latter, the promisee's performance of the condition constitutes con-
sideration under the unilateral-contract theory, and promissory es-
toppel is not available. Distinguishing between conditional gift
promises and promises made conditional on receiving something in
exchange is often very difficult. The facts of the "Sister Antillico"' 25
case serve as an illustration. The defendant, upon hearing that his
brother had died leaving a widow with two children, informed the
widow that he had an empty cabin in which he would let her and her
children live. The defendant added that he, a bachelor, was lonely
and would enjoy their company. Sister Antillico gave up the farm
she had inherited and with her children traveled the long distance to
the defendant's farm. Unfortunately, she and the defendant did not
get along, and he ejected her and her children two years after their
arrival.
All of this happened before promissory estoppel had become
law. The court therefore had to decide whether Sister Antillico's
giving up her inherited farm and travelling the long distance to the
defendant's land was consideration. The court found no considera-
tion and Sister Antillico recovered nothing.' 26 The decision turned
on whether the defendant had offered her the use of the cabin in
exchange for their coming, because he hoped thereby to alleviate
his loneliness, or whether she gave up the inherited land and came
only as a condition to receiving the benefit of his purely donative
promise to give her the use of the cabin. The same determination
would have to be made if the case came up today, if promissory es-
toppel were redefined to apply only to promises not enforceable by
consideration. Note, however, that the redefinition affects only the
measure of recovery. Sister Antillico would be entitled to expecta-
124 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
125 Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
126 Id. at 133.
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tion damages if the defendant's promise was interpreted as asking
for an exchange; however, she would be limited to reliance damages
if his promise was interpreted as purely donative.
E. Failing to Punish "Overpromising"
The reliance measure imposes no liability for "overpromising."
Consider once more the facts of Red Owl. The defendant never actu-
ally refused to give the plaintiff a franchise. Its failure of perform-
ance consisted rather of its first making the valuable and enticing
promise of giving the plaintiff a franchise for an investment of only
$18,000 and then, step by misleading step, requiring the plaintiff to
put up more and more of his own money until the plaintiff found the
amount to be more than he could raise. 127 This is "overpromising"
because the promisor does not intend to perform his promise as
fully, as unqualifiedly or as unconditionally as he has led the prom-
isee to expect. He thus promises more than he intends to deliver as a
way of inducing the promisee into relying to such an extent that he
will be unable to back out. The promisor will then be able to obtain
counterperformance from the promisee at much less cost to the
promisor than his "overpromising" led the promisee to expect.
"Overpromising," in other words, is the promise of an espe-
cially good deal, which the promisor never expects to perform, as a
means of maneuvering the promisee into accepting a much worse
deal. By the time the promisee realizes he has been manipulated, he
will be in too far to back out. The plaintiff in Red Owl had been
manipulated into agreeing to put up $31,000 of his own money.
The defendant then raised the required investment to $34,000, at
which point the plaintiff finally gave up. Had the plaintiff agreed to
the increase to $34,000, might the defendant's increases have con-
tinued? One suspects that the defendant had a number of would-be
franchisees whom it was stringing along, and that it finally gave
franchises to those from whom it could draw the most blood.
In Red Owl, the reliance measure neither compensated the
plaintiff for this kind of misleading manipulation nor provided the
defendant with an incentive not to engage in it. The plaintiff would
not have been entitled to any more damages than he received if the
initial promise had been to give him a franchise for only $10,000,
for example, because the value of the promise is relevant only under
the expectation measure. An unscrupulous person thus has no rea-
son not to "promise the moon" in order to induce the action that he
127 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 687-91, 133 N.W.2d 267, 269-
71 (1965).
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wants his "sucker" to take, if the amount for which he will be liable
will be just the "sucker's" reliance.
One might argue that the law of contract need not be con-
cerned with deterring or compensating for "overpromising," be-
cause such behavior constitutes fraud under the law of tort, which
already provides sufficient deterrence and compensation. The argu-
ment carries very little weight. Promissory fraud is notoriously diffi-
cult to prove, because it requires proof that the promisor had no
intention to perform when the promise was made. A later change of
heart is not enough.' 28 Even if fraud is proven, the normal damages
are just the defrauded person's reliance. True, some jurisdictions
allow punitive damages for fraud, but others do not, 29 and still the
difficulties of proof remain. It is also true that some jurisdictions
allow the defrauded party to "affirm the contract" into which he has
been fraudulently induced, thereby entitling him to expectation
damages for the contract's breach.'3 0 But if damages for breach of a
contract made enforceable by promissory estoppel were limited to
the reliance measure, "affirming" the contract in a promissory es-
toppel case would not have this effect. One's damages would still be
limited to the reliance measure.
F. Encouraging Inefficient Breach
A reliance measure provides an incentive to make inefficient
breaches of contract.' 3 ' A breach of contract is efficient if it leaves
neither party worse off. Expectation damages are efficient because
they leave the victim of the breach in just as good a position as if the
contract had been performed. Expectation damages provide a party
who is contemplating whether to breach an incentive not to, unless
he will gain enough by the breach to permit him to compensate the
other party for his losses and still have a net profit for himself.
Thus, there is an incentive to breach only when neither party will be
made worse off.
Reliance damages are not designed to, and usually do not, pro-
vide these incentives. Since reliance damages are typically less than
expectation damages, parties ordinarily receive too little incentive
not to breach. Consequently, parties are encouraged to breach even
when their gains will not offset the other party's losses. One might
128 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.14, at 253.
129 Id § 12.8, at 842-44.
130 Id § 4.15.
131 See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damages Measures and Economic Effi-
ciency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273, 285 (1970); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liqui-
dated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model
and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 CoLuM. L. REv. 554, 556 (1977).
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think that because the promisee's reliance occasionally exceeds his
expectation, reliance damages might occasionally overdeter inten-
tional breaches. Such overdeterrence would not be desirable be-
cause overdeterrence is as inefficient as underdeterrence.' 3 2 But
the thought is incorrect in any event. The expectation measure sets
a limit on the reliance measure, at least under most
circumstances. 133
G. Encouraging Waste
The reliance measure would also encourage waste under some
circumstances if the law made clear that promisees were limited to
reliance damages in estoppel cases. Since the promisee would know
that he would be entitled only to reliance damages if the promise
were not performed, he would be encouraged to run up the reliance
damages as high as he justifiably could. This would motivate the
promisor to perform in order to avoid having to pay the heightened
"reliance" damages. Such conduct would cause waste whether or
not the ploy was successful. If the ploy were successful, the prom-
isee would have incurred unnecessary expenses. And if the ploy
were unsuccessful, the promisor would pay greater damages than he
otherwise would have, to no net benefit to the promisee.13 4
Although the contract foreseeability rule sets a limit on how much a
promisee could thus add to a promisor's potential liability,' 3 5 this
limit is unavoidably flexible. A promisor can never be certain in ad-
vance how much, if any, protection the rule will give.
H. Failing to Provide a Secure Basis for Contracting
Finally, the expectation measure is superior to the reliance
measure because it provides a more secure basis for promising. It is
more secure for the promisee because it provides him with the
money equivalent of what he was promised. It is more secure for
the promisor because, for the most part, it keeps his risks of liability
dependent on events over which he has control. In contrast, the
reliance measure makes the promisor's liability dependent on the
extent of the promisee's reliance, over which the promisor generally
has no control. This is a drawback in any case, but it is intolerable
for promisors with thousands or millions of similar contracts out-
132 Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation and the Theory of Efficient Breach,
61 S. CAL. L. REv. 629, 662-63 (1988).
133 See, e.g., L. Albert & Son v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 178 F.2d 182 (2d Cir. 1949).
134 This point has been made in the law and economics literature often enough to be
included in current summaries. See A. MrrCHELL POLINSKY, AN4 INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS 34-37 (2d ed. 1989).
135 See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
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standing at any time. This is the situation of the so-called "standard
form contractor," which is extremely common in modem society.
III. RELIANCE ELEMENTS IN THE EXPECTATION MEASURE
A. The Entry of Reliance into the Expectation Measure
The promisee's reliance can be the measure of damages in it-
self, as we have seen. i3 6 Reliance can also enter into the expectation
measure. One formula for stating expectations is the sum of costs
of performance incurred by the promisee up to the time of breach
and his expected profit on the whole contract. This is the expecta-
tion measure commonly used for situations in which the promisor is
the owner of the land upon which a building is to be built. The
contractor's costs are incurred in reliance on the landowner's prom-
ise to pay him when the work is complete. Therefore, the expecta-
tion measure is equal to the promisee's reliance plus his expected
profit.
The promisee's reliance can also enter into the expectation
measure through consequential damages. The purchaser of a new
automobile, for example, drives it in reliance on the manufacturer's
implied warranty of merchantability. If the owner of the vehicle or
the vehicle itself is harmed as a result of a breach of this warranty,
the owner is entitled to damages based upon his reliance on the war-
ranty of merchantability. Although there are other ways by which
reliance enters into the expectation measure, these two sufficiently
illustrate the possibilities.
The fact that reliance is only one of the components of the ex-
pectation measure provides some insight into why the reliance
measure of damages is deficient. It only compensates for one of the
many different ways in which a promisee may have been harmed; the
expectation measure, in principle at least, includes all of them. In
the two illustrations just given, for example, the reliance element
alone is insufficient in one (the building contractor), whereas it is
sufficient in the other (the unsafe automobile). The difference, of
course, is that there are other important elements of harm in the
first case (the contractor's expected profit), but not in the second.
Since the automobile owner did not purchase the automobile ex-
pecting to make a profit (as he would have if he were a retailer ex-
pecting to resell it), his compensation for his out-of-pocket losses
was enough to make him whole.
136 See supra notes 18-43 and accompanying text.
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B. "Over-Relying"
A line of articles stretching from 1980 to the present, written by
members of the law and economics movement,13 7 makes the follow-
ing criticism of the expectation measure: although the expectation
measure optimizes the promisor's incentive to perform, it is ineffi-
cient in giving the promisee no incentive to restrain his reliance.
Promisees, as a result, may "over-rely" because they underestimate
the risk that the promisor may not perform, and society as a whole
will incur costs that might have been avoided. Some of these com-
mentators have therefore proposed limiting the reliance portion of
expectation damages to the "socially optimal" amount of reliance,
with the courts deciding, after the fact, how much this would have
been.138 The economic analyses used to reach these conclusions
rest on the assumption that the promisee chooses his level of reli-
ance with perfect knowledge of the probability that the promisor
will not perform. l3 9
The last article in this series that appeared before I finished this
Article was one by Richard Craswell.' 40 Although he agrees with
the criticisms of the expectation measure leveled in previous arti-
des, Craswell rejects the assumption of the promisee's perfect
knowledge and the proposal that the reliance portion of expectation
damages be limited to what a court decided would have been the
socially optimal amount. Instead, Craswell proposes that the prom-
isee's recovery under the expectation measure be limited to the
level of reliance that the promisor's statements to him indicated
would be socially optimal. Craswell asserts that his proposal is su-
perior for the following reasons: (1) courts are ill-equipped to de-
cide the socially optimal level of reliance;' 4 ' (2) it is fairer to hold
the promisee responsible only to the extent that the promisor gave
him the information he needed to judge the likelihood of the prom-
isor's performance; 142 and (3) limiting the promisee's recovery in
this manner checks the promisor's tendency to overstate the likeli-
hood of his performance, because every increase in the stated likeli-
hood would also increase the damages for which he might be
137 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcoN.
466 (1980). See generally Richard Graswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-sided Information,
18J. LEGAL STUD. 365, 365-66 (1989) (referring to the law and economics literature on
the point since 1980).
138 See Craswell, supra note 137, at 365-66 n.3 (citing examples of such proposals in
the literature).
139 See id at 366 n.4.
140 Id
141 Id. at 366, 385-88.
142 Id
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liable.' 43 Thus, Craswell concludes that his proposed limitation
would optimize both the promisor's incentive to perform and the
promisee's incentive to rely on the promise.144
Craswell's rejection of the unrealistic assumption of the prom-
isee's perfect knowledge is commendable. His proposal that the
promisee be bound only to the extent of what the promisor told him
is a considerable improvement over the proposal found in prior arti-
cles that promisees be held to a standard of perfect information.
Nevertheless, neither the criticisms of the expectation measure (in
which all the articles, including Craswell's, seem to concur) nor
Craswell's improved proposal for remedying the measure's claimed
deficiencies is sound. They all rest on the same fallacious assump-
tion of law, and they all violate the same principles of economics
and contract.145
C. Ignoring the Contract Foreseeability Rule
The law and economics scholars incorrectly assume that a
promisee can ignore with impunity the possibility of a promisor's
nonperformance. This assumption ignores the contract foreseeabil-
ity rule, which denies compensation for any losses that would have
been avoided by reasonable foresight.' 46 For example, a manufac-
turer that fails to guard against late deliveries of parts or supplies by
not keeping a reasonable inventory will be denied compensation for
the resulting stoppage of its production line. 4 7 Likewise, one who
sends a financial order to a foreign bank cannot recover for his reli-
ance upon the bank's promise to follow the order accurately and
promptly, to the extent that the sender's reliance exceeds his rea-
sonable expectation of the value of the order being thus followed.148
Or, if one expends $200,000 in reliance on a promise to grant a fast-
food franchise valued at $100,000, the promisor's liability presuma-
bly would be limited to $100,000 in the event he breached.' 49
Proper analysis of over-reliance would ask whether the foresee-
ability rule's incentive not to over-rely is enough, too much, or
about right. There is no way of answering this question in the ab-
stract. The answer will vary depending on what value we attach to
143 Id. at 367-68.
144 Id. at 398.
145 See also Jim Leitzel, Reliance and Contract Breach, 52 LAw & CO=TMP. PROBS. 87,
90-91 (1989), which deals with the same subject as does this section, although it makes
different assumptions and reaches somewhat different condusions.
146 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 12.14.
147 E.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
148 E.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982).
149 A. CORBIN, supra note 28, § 1018.
[Vol. 76:197230
RELIANCE IN CONTRACT DAMAGES
promisees taking precautions against promises not being per-
formed-and also on what value we attach to promisees not having
to take such precautions, because they can rest assured that either
promises will be performed or that the law will provide adequate
compensation if they are not. The law and economics commenta-
tors have described why we should place some value on promisees
taking precautions. Promisees will incur fewer losses from nonper-
formance if they take such precautions than if they do not. But
these commentators fail to realize that a value ought also to be
placed on promisees not having to take the precautions.1 50
The reason a value should also be placed on promisees not hav-
ing to take precautions against nonperformance is that taking pre-
cautions is costly. Costs are associated with keeping inventories of
parts or supplies, or taking steps to assure prompt and accurate
transmission of messages (such as sending duplicate messages by
other means at the same time). The contract foreseeability rule bal-
ances the competing values of taking and not taking precautions by
the "reasonable person" standard. "Reasonableness" is interpreted
by reference to the relevant trade or business as well as to any spe-
cial warnings either party gave the other at or before the time the
contract was made. If he breaches, a contracting party is held liable
only to the extent that he could reasonably have foreseen the other
party's reliance.' 5 ' Of course, the foreseeability rule as it has
evolved may not be ideal in every respect. In particular, it may not
be efficient. My point is not to try to decide these issues but only to
demonstrate that the law and economics criticisms of the expecta-
tion measure were aimed at the wrong target. These scholars
should have aimed their criticisms at the foreseeability rule-and
presumably would have had they been aware of it.
D. Violating Fundamental Principles
The law and economics scholars also inadvertently violate some
fundamental principles of.contract law and, ironically, of their own
discipline. They would have the law determine, to the extent possi-
ble, the efficient degree of reliance. When the law is incapable, the
determination would be left to the jury or judge. But this is incon-
150 The formula symbols that the law and economics commentators use can be inter-
preted to take the cost of precautions against the other party's nonperformance into
account, because they all use some symbol for the value of that party's performance. See,
e.g., Craswell, supra note 137, at 368. The value of the performance rises if the cost of
the precautions against nonperformance drops, and vice versa. Nevertheless, nothing in
the way in which the symbols are used or in the textual context indicates the cost of
precautions was taken into account. Nothing in the text refers to it expressly or even by
reasonable implication.
151 E. FAmSwORTH, supra note 1, § 12.14, at 877.
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sistent with one of the most fundamental principles of all contract
law: freedom of contract. This principle provides that the parties to
a contract-not the law, a jury, a judge, or any other public body--
make such determinations. The parties make these determinations
in their contract, either by express contractual provision or by im-
plied incorporation of trade practice. If a particular degree of relia-
bility is common in the trade, it will be implied in the contract unless
refuted by explicit language. 152 The foreseeability rule asks what
degree of reliance the breaching party could reasonably have fore-
seen when the contract was made. The law and economics commen-
tators enforce whatever degree of reliance the law determines would
have been optimal.
One might think that the law and economics proposals could be
made consistent with freedom of contract by interpreting them as
default rules, to be applied only when the parties had not agreed on
the amount of reliance to which they were entitled under the con-
tract. Portions of Craswell's article indicate that this is indeed how
he intends his proposals to be interpreted. However, those portions
are misleading because these proposals still regard the relevant
communications between the parties as solely those concerning the
probability of performance, and not those concerning the amount of
reliance. 153 Under Craswell's proposals, it is still the law or a public
official that determines the optimal amount of reliance given the
probability of performance. None of the other commentators goes
even this far; they would not even give effect to the actual communi-
cation between the parties for the purpose of estimating the
probability of performance. Rather, they would assume perfect in-
formation and have the law, a judge, or jury determine the socially
optimal degree of reliance accordingly.' 54
My colleague, George Lefcoe, whose comments to me first sug-
gested this line of argument, also pointed out the bizarre results that
would logically follow if the law or a public official, instead of the
parties, were to determine the optimal level of reliance. One of the
practices to which the efficiency ofJapanese industry is attributed is
"zero inventory." Manufacturers maintain as little inventory as pos-
sible, none in some cases, in order to reduce production costs. The
"zero inventory" practice necessitates that supplies that would
152 E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 7.13.
153 See Craswell, supra note 137, at 386 ("If the promisor has recommended a spe-
cific level of reliance to the promisee, no further inquiry is needed to identify the level
that appeared optimal in light of the promisor's representations."); id. at 396-97 ("[I]n
many settings sellers will not be able to express the probability of performance in pre-
cise, numerical terms, and will instead have to rely on such phrases as 'virtually certain,'
'about 50-50,' or 'it depends on the weather.' ").
154 See id. at 366, 385-88.
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otherwise be inventoried be delivered exactly on time. Delivered
too soon, they have to be inventoried and so defeat the purpose of
the practice. Delivered too late, the production process is brought
to a halt.
Some American manufacturers have instituted "zero inventory"
practices. Such a manufacturer presumably would notify its suppli-
ers of the practice. Under the foreseeability rule, that notification
would be sufficient to hold the supplier liable for the much higher
damages that a late delivery would cause, unless something was said
to contradict this expectation in the contract. But under the law as
the law and economics commentators envisage it, the judge would
decide for herself whether the manufacturer's greatly heightened re-
liance on the supplier's promptness was optimal or not, and award
damages accordingly. The judges of state and federal courts would
be the ultimate arbiters of the extent to which "zero inventory" was
to be adopted by American industry. Precedents would accumulate
as their decisions were reported, and eventually there would be
"low inventory" and "high inventory" states. The extent to which a
manufacturer got legal protection for its "zero inventory" practices
would thus depend on where its plants were located.
This result would also violate fundamental principles of eco-
nomics. The competitive market, not laws or government officials,
should answer questions regarding optimum reliance levels or pre-
cautions against nonperformance. Businesses that answer such
questions more effectively will make more profits, prosper, and
eventually come to occupy a larger share of the market. The result
urged by law and economics scholars would also violate a funda-
mental principle of allocative efficiency. Efficiency theory gathers its
great power from the principle that each person decides for himself
what will increase or decrease his utility. The theory then shows
how all individual utilities can be maximized, each in its own terms,
under the existent constraints, without anyone having to accept
what someone else thinks is good for him or for society as a whole.
So if the law, judges, or other public officials were to decide how
much we could rely on our contracts being performed, the result
would be less efficient than allowing each of us to reach our own
decisions.
E. Interpreting Theoretical Works of Law and Economics
It has been forcefully argued to me that the foregoing criticisms
are unfair and unjustified. Works of theory, I was told, are not to be
interpreted as having any relevance to anything outside their own
ambit unless they say so expressly. Perhaps my criticisms were
therefore wrong in interpreting the articles concerned as uninten-
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tionally ignoring the contract foreseeability rule, because they can
more reasonably be interpreted as intentionally ignoring it. Accord-
ing to this line of argument, they should be interpreted as theoreti-
cal exercises in the effects the expectation measure would have on
promisees' reliance if the expectation measure were the only rule of
contract law in existence. Since none of the articles expressly says
that the law of contract does not contain a contract foreseeability
rule, none of them can fairly be criticized for ignoring it.
I disagree.
One could hardly expect a writer who was unintentionally ig-
noring something to say he was ignoring it. That would be about as
likely as a person forgetting to take his umbrella saying, "By the
way, I am not taking my umbrella." Additionally, the foreseeability
rule is so well known as to make it incredible that the failure to men-
tion it was an intentional experiment rather than a simple mistake.
The rule dates from 1854, when it was originated in the famous
English case of Hadley v. Baxendale.' 55 It has been in common use
ever since, as can be seen by a reference to any reasonably complete
compilation of contract law published since the late nineteenth cen-
tury. Any thought experiment of what the law of contract would be
like without it would be about as unlikely as a thought experiment of
what automobiles would be like with only three wheels.
My criticisms were also said to be wrong in assuming that the
articles at which they were directed were urging changes in the law,
when in fact they were not. No matter how sharply articles criticize
existing law or how strongly they urge the superiority of rules that
differ from it, I was told, they should not be interpreted as calling
for changes in the law unless they expressly call for them. Again, in
the absence of express language, they should be interpreted as exer-
cises in pure theory. I fail to see the benefit in such a restricted
interpretation, however, and it would surely be contrary to most
writers' intent. If those of us who express normative judgments
about the law do not hope that someone will act on them, why do we
express them? At the very least, it would seem incumbent on some-
one who made normative judgments but did not want anyone to act
on them to explicitly express this desire.
Certainly many law and economics commentators have shown
by their words or actions that they hope their normative judgments
will be acted upon. Lewis A. Kornhauser's An Introduction to the Eco-
nomic Analysis of Contract Remedies,' 56 for example, makes the follow-
ing observation in its initial pages:
155 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
156 57 U. CoLo. L. REV. 683 (1986).
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"While courts have not yet sought guidance from economic
analysis, an understanding of its principles is likely to prove useful
to the practitioner for several reasons. First, economic analysts
have offered substantial arguments for revising or rationalizing
specific doctrines. Those seeking to reform the law governing liq-
uidated damages or specific performance or to rationalize the law
of mitigation would do well to consult the economically informed
literature." 1 57
Kornhauser is not just saying that it is his opinion that those seeking
to reform the laws he mentions would do well to consult the eco-
nomically informed literature. I think it is also fair to read him as
assuming that the analysts to whom he refers had similar hopes for
their analyses. The two prominent law and economics commenta-
tors on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Richard A. Posner and
Frank H. Easterbrook, provide another kind of example. They have
not hesitated to use their own or others' law and economics analyses
in their own judicial decisions. 158
Finally, one does not even need to interpret the articles I have
criticized as calling for changes in the law in order to make my criti-
cisms valid. It is enough just to hold them to ordinary standards of
relevance. They address the subject of law and economics. Presum-
ably the "law" is the law of the United States. What is the relevance
of a law and economics article not thought to deal with the law with
which the reader is familiar? The only reasonable interpretation of
any article in law and economics, in the absence of some clear warn-
ing to the contrary, is that it is dealing with the law that actually
exists in the country of its intended readers.
F. Mea Culpa
I contributed to the errors in the law and economics commen-
tary discussed in the preceding criticism. After reading an earlier
draft of Richard Craswell's article that is among those I have just
criticized, and participating in a workshop at which it was presented,
I failed to discern these errors initially. They dawned on me almost
a year later in preparing this article. This experience has caused me
to reflect on why I had been so careless. That the contract foresee-
ability rule both deters and limits liability for a promisee's over-reli-
ance is such an obvious fact to anyone familiar with contract law,
that it seems incredible that the ignoring of it in Craswell's paper
was not immediately evident to me. It seems just as incredible, of
157 Id at 684-85 (footnotes omitted).
158 See, e.g., Flamm v. Eberstadt, 814 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.);
Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir.) (PosnerJ.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1017 (1982).
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course, that Craswell and all the others beginning with Shaven back
in 1980 also overlooked the rule.
Presumably the readers of these articles also overlooked the
omission of the foreseeability rule. If not, presumably some of them
would have communicated with the authors privately or published
something pointing out their oversight. An article by Jeffrey M.
Perloff, in fact, published only a year after Shaven's article, argues
that the foreseeability rule solves the efficiency problems about
which Shavell and the others in the series are concerned. In so do-
ing, he cites Shavell's article.' 59 Perloff's article, moreover, was
published in The Journal of Legal Studies, which specializes in law and
economics. Perhaps the article was never noticed by the authors
who followed Shavel because, despite citing Shavell, Perloff's criti-
cism was not aimed directly at him. Perloff characterized his target
as the line of articles concerned with the "appropriate remedy in the
event of breach of contract."' 160 These possible remedy rules, as he
conceived of them, were rules in addition to the expectation meas-
ure. 161 Shavell and the authors who followed him, on the other
hand, conceived of the expectation measure as operating without
qualification, as we have seen. In the last analysis, however, I do not
think there is any explanation except that we bungled it. The only
thing to be done now is to expose the mistake, which I hope I have,
and get on to matters upon which we can spend our time more
usefully.
CONCLUSION
The attempts to replace the expectation measure with the reli-
ance measure of damages when the breached contract was based on
promissory estoppel all suffer from the same fallacy. They equate
the measure of compensation with the grounds of enforcement, an
equation that has no basis in logic or policy. Furthermore, such an
equation insures that the compensation will be inadequate in any
case except one in which the promisee's reliance coincidentally hap-
pens to equal his expectation. The proponents have nothing more
to support their attempts than their reluctance to see "pure" con-
tract "polluted" by the doctrine that originated in tort. They are the
last holdouts in a battle that the legal conservatives were waging
against promissory estoppel even before the Restatement (First) of
Contracts was published in 1932.
The efficiency criticisms of the expectation measure also suffer
159 Jeffrey M. Perloff, Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 39, n.1 (1981).
160 Id. at 39.
161 See id. at 43-44.
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from fallacies although these are even more elementary. They ig-
nore the foreseeability rule and all other contract doctrines that af-
fect the parties' incentives and influence the amounts of damages-
they must pay or can receive. They violate the principles of freedom
of contract and of efficiency. These principles dictate that the par-
ties be allowed to determine the extent to which their reliance on
the other's performance shall be compensated if the performance is
not forthcoming.
